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中文摘要
本文利用 Black & Scholes或有請求權分析來探討，來探討主併銀行
運用其利率制定的策略，以追求併購淨利極大化的目標；換言之，利
用併購策略追求利潤極大化。本文模型主要考慮的要素有三：放款產
品互補/替代的特性、放款利率策略性互補/替代的策略和資本管制政
策。結合這三種主要因素，探討主併銀行的最適放款利率。主要發現：
當主併銀行占合併銀行的股份比例相對少時，最適利率將會相對高；
當政府加強資本管制時，主併銀行最適利率將會降低。這兩個主要結
論繫乎於放款產品的互補性及放款利率的策略性互補之假設。因此，
本文銀行合併行為中的放款產品及其競爭策略的另一種詮釋。
3Acquisition and Capital Regulation of a Rate-Setting Acquirer  Bank:
A Contingent Claim Analysis
Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of the acquirer bank’s optimal loan-rate 
settings based on a firm-theoretical option-pricing model under the maximum net gain 
from acquisition.  The model demonstrates how the nature of the loan 
(substitutes/complements), loan-rate-setting strategies (strategic substitutes/strategic 
complements) and regulation conditions jointly determine the acquirer bank’s optimal 
loan-rate settings.  We find that the acquirer bank’s loan-rate-settings are negatively 
related to the proportion of the combined banks owned by the acquirer bank’s 
shareholders and also negatively related to the capital regulation under the nature of 
the loan complements and the loan-rate-setting complement strategy.  Our findings 
provide an alternative explanation for the acquirer bank’s strategies for operating and 
competing in the market concerning bank acquisition behavior.
Keywords: Black-Scholes Valuation, Loan Rate Setting, Acquisition,
Capital Regulation.
JEL Classification: G13, G14
1.  Introduction
Expected increases in market share for loans, deposits and other services and 
geographic diversification to reduce risk by serving markets with different economic 
profiles and income flows caused by the liberalization of the banking and finance 
4systems have contributed to a surge in mergers and acquisitions in the last two 
decades.  Further adding momentum to this movement, the regulatory authorities 
have been plagued in many Asian countries who often use mergers and acquisitions 
since the financial crisis in mind-1997.  Merging two banks to create a stronger one 
is seen as a panacea, thus resulting in more mergers and acquisitions.
The number of large acquisitions in recent years has allowed for the study of 
their effects on public shareholders and stock market reactions to the mergers (Neely, 
1987).  This merger-event approach focuses on stock prices around the time of the 
merger announcement.1  Generally, we hypothesize that the only situation in which a 
weak bank can be successfully rescued in a merger is when the acquirer bank is much 
larger and stronger than the bank being acquired.  Mergers and acquisitions become 
interesting when competition is imperfect.  As a consequence, Neely’s argument 
about increasing large acquisitions further allows the study of their effects on equity 
holders on the basis of the structure-conduct-performance characteristics of the 
firm-theoretic approach.
There are at least two different but equally important areas where a thorough 
understanding of the importance of large acquisitions is essential.  First, finance 
theory suggests that acquisitions, like other investment decisions, should occur 
because they are positive net-present-value projects that increase the market value of 
the acquirer firm’s shareholders.  The acquisition investment decisions rely largely 
on understanding the return-risk characteristics of the portfolio-theoretic approach.  
Second, firm theory claims that the operating synergies in a strategic acquisition, like 
                                                          
1 Malatesta (1983), Neely (1987), and Cornett & De (1991) utilized merger events to analyze the 
wealth effect of merger activity.
5other profit-maximizing decisions, occur because the acquirer firm can raise product 
prices after buying up the competition, therefore, gaining monopoly power through 
mergers.  The profit-maximizing acquisition decisions thus depend on an 
understanding of the structure-conduct-performance characteristics of a firm-theoretic 
approach.
The principal advantage of the portfolio-theoretic approach is the explicit 
treatment of uncertainty, which has played a prominent role in acquisition discussions.  
More specifically, as mentioned by Neely, the target banking firms included in his 
sample were larger compared to most typical target banks because they were publicly 
traded.  The uncertainty treated as stock return volatility is of considerable 
importance to investors since return volatility expectations influence the acquirer 
bank’s portfolio choice and are critical factors in pricing options.  Thus, an 
understanding of the volatility expectations and their relationship to the expected 
returns in banking acquisitions is critical.  One of the objectives of this paper 
includes using the Black-Scholes (1973) formula, often employed to compute an 
implied variance from call option market prices,2 to provide such an understanding.
Although uncertainty is well captured in the portfolio-theoretic approach, this 
approach omits a key behavior in bank acquisitions.  It is assumed that asset and 
deposit markets are perfectly competitive so that rate taking (or quantity-setting) is the 
relevant behavioral mode in both markets.  However, bank acquisitions, especially 
large bank acquisitions are made only when competition is imperfect.  In addition, 
the premiums paid in bank acquisitions are critical to a cost-benefit framework for 
                                                          
2 Merton (1989) and Crouhy & Galai (1991) evaluated financial intermediaries using a continuous 
time contingent claim framework.  Mullins & Pyle (1994) analyzed risk-based capital rues in a single 
period model which relied on the Black-Scholes option valuation.
6analyzing bank acquisitions as noted by Sinkey (1992, pp. 846-847).  According to 
Rhoades (1987), the premiums paid in bank acquisitions can be treated as an indicator 
of the firm or market characteristics that are attractive to the managers of the acquirer 
firms.  Furthermore, the liberalization of banking and finance systems also 
deregulates banking markets and activities, including the lending and absorption of 
funds.  This paper also utilizes the firm-theoretic approach in order to capture the 
deregulation effect on acquisitions.
Bank acquisitions have significantly changed their asset and capital positions.  
Asset quality problems arising form the increase in acquisition activity has plagued 
banks in recent years.  To force bank capital positions to reflect asset portfolio risks, 
the regulatory authority can utilize a risk-based system of capital standards.  Changes 
in the regulatory parameters are expected to affect bank acquisitions as well as bank 
profits and risks.
In light of previous work, the purpose of this paper is to develop a model of a 
strategic bank acquisition that integrates the risk consideration of the 
portfolio-theoretic approach with the market conditions and capital regulations of the 
firm-theoretic approach.  More specifically, the Black-Scholes formula is extended 
to integrate the portfolio-theoretic volatilities with the firm-theoretic rate-setting 
modes in an analysis of the acquirer bank’s strategy for maximizing the net gain from 
the acquisition.  The comparative-static results of the model are examined to 
determine the influence of give-and-take premiums in the acquisition and capital 
regulation of an acquirer bank’s loan rate-setting decisions.  We find that the acquirer 
bank’s loan-rate setting is negatively related to the premiums paid in the bank 
acquisition and the capital-to-deposit ratio, considering some specific firm and market 
7characteristics as well as uncertainty.  Our findings provide an alternative 
explanation for the acquirer bank’s strategies for operating and competing in the loan 
market concerning bank acquisition.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II sets up a cost-benefit framework 
for analyzing bank acquisition.  Section III develops the basic structure of the model.  
Section IV provides a derivation solution of the model and the comparative static 
analysis while the final section contains concluding remarks.
2.  Cost-Benefit Framework
A cost-benefit framework for analyzing a strategic bank acquisition under 
uncertainty is constructed.  The benefit of a bank acquisition can be stated as the 
difference between the synergistic present value of the combined banks, 2&1S , and the 
sum of both the acquirer and acquired banks’ present values, S  and *S , 
respectively, if they operate separately.  0*2&1 >-- SSS  makes this acquisition 
potentially worthwhile.  Moreover, the cost of the acquisition can be expressed as the 
difference between the amount paid for the acquired bank, *P , and its value as a 
separate bank.   Accordingly, the premium paid for the acquired bank is ** SP - .  
The premium is believed to be the maximum by the acquired bank whereas this cost is 
expected to be the minimum by the acquirer bank.  Thus, the premium is determined 
using a give-and-take negotiation process between the acquirer bank and the acquired 
bank.  Combining the benefit and the cost of the bank acquisition, a potentially 
beneficial acquisition investment decision is beneficial if the benefit is expected to 
8exceed the cost, that is,3
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The difference in the above equation is treated as the net gain from the strategic 
acquisition activity to the acquirer bank.  The focal point of the cost-benefit analysis 
emphasizes determining the values and premiums of the bank acquisition since the net 
gain can also be expressed as 0*2&1 >-- PSS  by rearranging terms in the equation 
above.  Therefore, the net gain from the acquisition will be positive if the present 
value of the combined banks is greater than the present value of the acquirer bank plus 
the price paid for the acquired bank.  Note that price of the acquired bank is defined 
as its present value plus the purchase premium.
Determining the amount paid for the acquired bank, *P , is a critical issue in 
acquisition analysis.  As noted by Sinkey, the payment formula used when the 
acquisition is financed using common stock can be expressed as d  multiplied by the 
value of the combined banks, 2&1
* SP d= , where d is the proportion of the 
                                                          
3 The total market value of the combined banks may not increase after the merger.  The merger will 
increase the wealth of the acquirer bank’s shareholders if the merger price is sufficiently low (it may 
even have to be negative, pointed out by Delhaise (1998, p.44)), even if the total market value of the 
combined banks decreases after the merger.  Conversely, the merger will decrease the wealth of the 
acquirer bank’s shareholders if the merger price is sufficiently high, even if the total market value of the 
combined banks increases after the merger.  In the Asian financial turmoil of 1997, Delhaise’s 
(1998,p.44) contention is that “… some banks for sale are not exactly offering the kind of return on 
equity foreign buyers would expect.  This problem can be reflected in the acquisition price, … many 
banks would have to carry a negative sale price to attract a buyer.”  In addition, from the viewpoint of 
the acquirer bank’s acquisition investment decision, its manager is most likely motivated to increase the 
wealth of his shareholders.  Thus, this paper makes a possible assumption in specifying a positive 
net-gain formula for acquisition pricing.
if strategic acquisition comes into operation
if strategic acquisition does not
9combined banks owned by the acquired bank’s shareholders, 10 << d .4  Thus, the 
net gain to the acquirer bank can be simplified and given by the difference between 
the present value of the combined banks owned by the acquirer bank’s shareholders
and the present value of the acquirer bank operating individually, 02&1 >- SSq , 
where dq -= 1 .
To manipulate the cost-benefit framework in this paper, several factors must be 
determined: d , q , the value of the combined banks, and the value of the bank 
making the acquisition.  These determinations are critical to the model shown in the 
following section.
3.  The Model
Consider a single-period model of a bank acquisition under loan repayment 
uncertainty.  An acquirer bank with no legal reserve requirement holds two types of 
earnings assets: open market securities, B , and loans, L .  The acquirer bank, in 
general, is generally a rate-taker in the open market so that the interest rate on open 
market securities, R , is given.  As mentioned earlier, mergers and acquisitions take 
priority when competition is imperfect.  As such, the acquirer bank is assumed to be 
a rate-setter that faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its loans and chooses the 
loan rate, LR , to maximize profits.  This assumption implies the acquirer bank 
                                                          
4 Estimating the premium paid for the bank to be acquired depends on how the merger is financed (e.g., 
cash, common stock, or some combination of the two).  In a cash transaction, the premium payment to 
the acquiree bank’s shareholders is independent of whether or not the merger activity conduct is a 
synergistic one since their return does not rely on the operation of the combined banks.  Calculating 
the premium payment for the stock financing approach is a completely different matter and can be 
computed using two different methods.  Rhoades (1987) determined three independent variables in his 
model: acquired firm characteristics, market characteristics, and acquiring firm characteristics.  
Darrell (1973) proposed three techniques to estimate premiums: the book-value approach, the 
market-to-book premiums, and the income-to income premiums.  Thus use of these techniques alters 
both d and premium values computed.
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exercises some monopoly power in its lending activities.5  Correspondingly, the 
acquired bank holds two types of earning assets: market securities, *B , and loans, *L , 
and chooses the loan rate, *LR , to maximize profits.
To capture the rate-setting conjectural variations, if both the acquirer bank and 
the acquired bank operate separately, the demands for loans faced by both banks are 
respectively
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where, L  and *L  are substitutes when 0* >¶¶ LRL )0(
* >¶¶ LRL  and 
complements when 0* <¶¶ LRL )0(
* <¶¶ LRL .
Rhoades analyzed the premiums paid in bank acquisitions using the assumption 
that the premiums paid signaled market characteristics.  Furthermore, regulatory 
capital requirements are an important factor in the firm characteristics of Rhoades’ 
investigation.  Given such factors, a risk-based system of capital standards is utilized 
since an acquisition involves capital expandability.  This system is designed to force 
a banks’ capital positions to reflect it’s asset portfolio risks; the essence of the 
portfolio-theoretic approach.
                                                          
5 For the characteristics of imperfect loan markets in which financial intermediaries exist, see Pringle 
(1973).  Empirical studies by Slovin & Sushka (1983), and Hancock (1986) support the use of 
rate-setting behavior in loan markets.  This assumption of imperfect loan markets is also employed by 
Zarruk & Madura (1992) to theoretically examine the relationships among capital regulation, deposit 
insurance, and optional bank interest margin.
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At the start of a single-period model, the acquirer bank raises D  in deposits and 
E  in equity capital.  E  is restricted through regulations to a fixed proportion of the 
acquirer bank’s deposits, qDE ³ .6  Following Zarruk & Madura (1992), the 
required capital-to-deposit ratio, q , is assumed to be an increasing function of the 
loans held by the acquirer bank at the beginning point of the period, 0>dLdq .  We 
assume that the acquired bank faces the same required capital-to-deposit ratio 
regulation as the acquirer bank.  Thus, ** qDE ³  and 0* >dLdq .
When the capital constraint is binding, both the acquirer and the acquired banks’ 
liquidity constraints are, respectively,
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The initial loanable funds are invested in a two-asset portfolio composed of 
default-free securities maturing at the end of the period and risky lending assets with 
an unspecified maturity greater than one period.  During the period, the value of the 
acquirer bank’s risky lending assets is
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6 For an analysis of the effects of capital requirements in terms of capital-to-deposit ratio, see Mullins 
& Pyle (1994).
without loan losses
with loan losses
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The total promised security repayments to the acquirer bank at the end of the 
period are certain because the open market securities are treated as risk-default assets 
in the model.  The value of the acquirer bank’s earning-asset portfolio, if operating 
separately, is then
)],()
1
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ERRRVA -+++=                                    (4)
The depositors are offered a rate DR  on their deposits.  The total promised 
payment to the depositors at the end of the period is qERD )1( + .  The limited 
liability effect of debt (deposits) financing creates a possible part of the residual 
claimants for debtholders (deposits).  Depositors will receive all of the promised 
payment only if that possibility does not occur at the end of the period.  However, all 
of the acquirer bank’s earning assets (even if insufficient to cover all debts) are owned 
by the depositors under bankruptcy.  The value of the deposits at the end of the 
period are given using:
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The value of the acquirer bank’s equity at the end of the period is defined as the 
residual value of the acquirer bank after meeting all of its debts, represented by
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By applying Crouhy & Galai (1991) and Mullins & Pyle (1994), it may be 
assumed that the dollar amount invested by the shareholders is equal to the call option 
they effectively purchase from the bondholders.  We then analyze the acquisition 
decision using a single period model, which relies on Black & Scholes’ option 
valuation.  The stochastic variable, S , is the market value of the acquirer bank’s 
assets at the time of an audit.  For the sake of parsimony, the cost of an audit is not 
considered in this model.  The market value of the equity S  in equation (6) can be 
treated as the Black-Scholes value of the call option written bellow.  The first part is 
the risk-adjusted present value of the acquirer bank’s assets (loans) with repayment 
uncertainty expressed using the standard deviation of the return.  The second part is 
referred to the risk adjusted present value of the acquirer bank’s net obligations to its 
initial depositors above and beyond its default-free securities.  This exercise is then 
expressed as a spread rate defined as the difference between the open market rate and 
the promised deposit rate, DRR -=m .  Under these assumptions, the acquirer 
bank’s equity market value for equation (6) can be described as:
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In equation (7), )( 1dN  and )( 2dN  are the cumulative standard normal 
distributions.  )( 1dN  is the risk adjustment factor of the acquirer bank’s risky assets 
(loans) while )( 2dN is the risk adjustment factor of the acquirer bank’s net 
obligations (the difference between deposit liability payment and open market 
securities repayment).  
2^
s  is the variance with vs  and ls  which are the 
instantaneous standard deviations for the rates of return on the risky and default-free 
assets, respectively.  lv,r  is the instantaneous correlation coefficient.
The presence of economies of scope and/or cost reduction may create an 
incentive for specialty banks to merge and become multiple-plant-multiple-product 
banks.  To determine the value of the combined banks in the cost-benefit acquisition 
framework, we assume that the combined banks are an imperfectly competitive 
financial intermediary that “produces” two distinct yet interrelated loans ( L  and *L ) 
in two separate “plants” (the acquirer bank and the acquired bank) and “sells” them in 
a market.  The combined banks’ two distinct yet interrelated loans have a 
complementary nature if, for example, a bank has an advantage in retail financial 
services specialization and the other has an advantage in wholesale financial services.  
They have the nature of substitutes if, for example, both banks have similar 
advantages in financial services specialization and are primarily based on the belief 
that possible gains can be acquired through management of these advantages.  Under 
the circumstances, the combined banks are treated as an imperfectly competitive 
multiple-plant-multiple-product financial intermediary with a multiple-loan demand 
function.
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The combined banks have *DD +  in deposits and *EE +  in equity capital.  
Performing the acquisition activity under the capital requirement regulation, *EE +
is assumed to be tied by the same fixed proportion q  of *DD +  as that of D  or 
*D  if operated separately.  Thus, when the capital constraint is binding, the 
combined banks’ liquidity constraint is 
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The combined loanable funds are also invested in default-free securities maturing 
at the end of the period and in risky lending assets with an unspecified maturity 
greater than one period.  At any time, the value of the combined banks’ risky assets 
is 
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The value of the combined banks’ earning-asset portfolios composed of the loan 
repayments and promised security repayments at the end of the period is 
without loan losses
with loan losses
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The value of the deposit liabilities at the end of the period is given using
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The value of the combined banks’ equity at the end of the period is
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Computing the acquisition analysis, the combined banks’ Black-Scholes call 
option value can be expressed as
If solvency    )( KH >
If insolvency   )( KH £
If solvency    )( KH >
If insolvency   )( KH £
17
)()),(),,(( 1
***
2&1 aNRRLRRLWS LLLL=
)
1
1)()[(1(
))(1(
{ *
*
q
EER
q
EERD +++-
++
-
)())]},(),,(( 2
*** aNeRRLRRLM LLLL
m--                             (14)
where,
}
2
1
]
])
1
1)()[(1(
))(1(
{[ln
1 2^
*
*^1 M
DM M
q
EER
q
EER
Wa sm
s
++
-+++-
++
=
^
12 Maa s-=
MvMMvMMvMM 11,
2
1
2^ 2
2
ssrsss -+=
In equation (14), )( 1aN  and )( 2aN , the cumulative standard normal 
distributions, are the risk adjustment factors of the present value of the combined 
banks’ assets and net obligations, respectively.  
2^
Ms  is the variance with vMs  and 
M1s , i.e. the instantaneous standard deviation of the rates of return on the risky and 
default-free assets, respectively.  MvM 1,r  is the instantaneous correlation coefficient.
The net gain from the strategic acquisition investment to the acquirer bank can 
be calculated with equations (7) and (14) by utilizing the cost-benefit framework 
discussed in the previous section.  The acquirer bank should merge with the acquired 
bank if the benefit exceeds the cost, that is,
02&1 >-= SSI q                                                    (15)
Thus, the acquirer bank’s net gain from the acquisition under the stock 
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transaction is positive if the present value of the combined banks owned by the 
acquirer bank’s shareholders is greater than the present value of the acquirer bank 
operating individually.  This limitation provides an alternative insight for the 
acquirer bank’s acquisition decision.7
4.  Equilibr ium and Comparative Statics
The acquirer bank’s objective in the strategic acquisition is to set LR  as well 
as *LR  in order to maximize the net gain.
8  Partially differentiating equation (15) 
with respect to LR  and 
*
LR , the first-order conditions are given by
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7 According to Rose’s (1987) empirical study, the acquired bank is significantly more profitable 
compared to the acquirer bank in returns earned for stockholders.  Rose’s findings may discourage the 
acquirer bank from conducing the acquisition.  Thus, it is not surprising if the acquirer bank cannot 
resist the temptation to look into the performance consideration.  The target function of equation (15) 
in this model provides a useful tool for the acquirer bank’s acquisition decision.
8 Acquisition is an investment issue and loan-rate setting is a competition issue of the banking industry.  
In managing value, a bank needs a strategy for competing in the market and a strategy for corporate 
control.  The objective of this paper is managing value using the loan-rate-setting acquirer bank to 
maximize the net gain from acquisition.  Rather than emphasizing the management of 
loan-rate-setting, for the purpose of simplicity, we assumed that variances in the risky loans are 
unaffected by changes in the loan rate.
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Note that the conjectural variations if operating together do not exist because the 
combined banks produce their own loans in different “plants” even though the 
combined banks are imperfectly competitive.  The first-order conditions in equations 
(16-1) and (16-2) determine the optimal loan rates; accordingly, the earning-asset 
portfolios.  Equation (16-1) implies that the acquirer bank sets its optimal loan rate, 
LR , at the point where the proportion of the combined banks owned by the acquirer 
bank’s shareholders, q , multiplied by the marginal equity value of LR  of the 
combined banks equals the “own” marginal equity value of LR  of the acquirer bank 
if operating individually.  Equation (16-2) implies that the acquirer bank set its 
optimal loan rate, *LR , at the point where the proportion q  multiplied by the 
marginal equity value of *LR  of the combined banks equals the “cross” marginal 
equity value of *LR  of the acquirer bank if operating individually.  Based on rather 
general assumptions, it is reasonable to believe that the marginal equity value of LR
is greater than the cross marginal equity value of *LR  at least in the short run.  
Accordingly, the marginal equity value of LR  of the combined banks is expected to 
exceed that of *LR  of the combined banks.  This result is intuitive because the 
combined banks may have comparative advantages to conduct LR  rather than 
*
LR
since the combined banks are in general managed by the acquirer rather than the 
acquired bank.
To analyze the comparative statics derived from equation (16-1) and (16-2), we 
require that the second-order and the stability conditions be satisfied.  They are
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The assumption 022 <¶¶ LRI  (
2*2
LRI ¶¶ ) shows that the acquirer bank’s 
marginal net gain value of LR  (
*
LR ) from the acquisition must fall when LR  (
*
LR ) is 
set increasingly.  Because both optimal loan rates are simultaneously determined by 
the acquirer bank to maximize the net gain from the acquisition, terms 
*2
LL RRI ¶¶¶
and LL RRI ¶¶¶
*2  demonstrate the acquirer bank’s interactive operation between its 
two heterogeneous loan-rate settings.  
*2
LL RRI ¶¶¶  can be represented in the
following way: the change in the expected marginal equity value to the loan-rate ( LR ) 
setting of the combined banks as influenced by the change in the other loan-rate ( *LR ) 
setting.  By applying Bulow, Geanakoplos & Klemperper (1985), the acquirer bank 
believes that its own loan-rate settings of LR  and 
*
LR  have the nature of a strategic 
substitute if 0
*2 <¶¶¶ LL RRI ; and a strategic complement if 0
*2 >¶¶¶ LL RRI .  We 
further assume that 0>D .  These assumptions insure that a unique symmetrical 
equilibrium exists in the acquirer bank conducting strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements.
A strategic substitute between two heterogeneous loans suggests that the acquirer 
bank increasing (decreasing) its loan rate setting ( LR ) is the best response when it 
decides to decrease (increase) its other loan rate ( *LR ).  The best response when the 
acquirer decides to increase (decrease) its other loan rate ( *LR ) as it increases 
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(decrease) its loan rate setting )( LR  is a strategic complement.  Rather than 
emphasizing a bank and its rival’s competitive strategy in Bulow, Geanakoplos & 
Klemperper’s sense, this paper expresses a loan’s interactive strategy conducted by 
the acquirer bank to maximize the net gain from the acquisition.  A bank acquisition 
can be viewed as a corporate-control transaction.  A bank needs strategies for 
operating and competing in the market for corporate control.  It is assumed that both 
loan markets faced by the acquirer bank are imperfectly competitive so that rate 
setting is the relevant behavioral mode not only in both markets but also in 
management itself.  A strategic substitute/complement in this paper suggests a 
strategy that integrates a corporate-control transaction with the market conditions and 
rate-setting behavioral modes of the acquirer bank.  LL RRI ¶¶¶
*2  can be 
correspondingly explained as 
*2
LL RRI ¶¶¶ .
In this model with the net gain maximization of the strategic acquisition, the 
effect of changes in the proportion of the combined banks owned by the acquirer 
bank’s shareholders q  on the acquirer bank’s loan-rate setting is explored in the 
following:
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An explanation of equation (17) is possible in term of: (i) product effect 
(substitutes or complements of the two loans), (ii) interactive operation effect 
(strategic substitutes or strategic complements), and (iii) risk effect (the risk 
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adjustment factors of the combined banks’ assets and net obligations).  The product 
effect is related to the nature of the combined banks’ two distinct yet interrelated 
loans.  The interactive operation effect is related to the best responses of the 
combined banks’ loan-rate settings in their multiple-plant-multiple-product operations.  
Equation (17) indicates that an increase in q  decreases the loan rate setting LR
only if the product effect is negative (complements), the interactive operation effect is 
positive (strategic complements), and the risk effect is positive (the risk adjustment 
factor of the assets are sufficient to cover that of the net obligations).  It is reasonable 
to believe that the nature of the product effect determines the interactive operation 
effect.  However, this paper illustrates that q  is negatively related to LR  under a 
possible constraint by the three effects mentioned as above.  It is also possible to 
have the products as substitutes and yet have strategic complements if the risk effect 
alters.
The give-and-take of the negotiation process determines both the acquisition cost 
and amount paid to the acquired bank’s shareholders.  In the negotiation, the 
acquired bank tries to maximize the benefit from the acquisition (maximizing d  in 
the model) whereas the acquirer bank tries to minimize the cost (maximizing q ).  
As mentioned earlier, Rose (1987) showed that the acquirer bank is significantly less 
profitable than the acquired bank in returns earned for shareholders.  q  is expected
to be relatively low.  Under these circumstances, the acquirer bank is allowed to 
utilize the loan-rate-setting strategy to maximize its benefit from the acquisition.
As pointed out by Vennet (1996), an acquirer bank can raise its product prices 
after acquiring competitors by gaining monopoly power through horizontal mergers.  
Rose (1993) found that an acquirer bank that did achieve higher post-merger returns 
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was frequently aided by increases in market concentration that resulted from its 
acquisition.  A bank with improving post-merger returns also displayed stronger 
control over loan losses.  Accordingly, an acquirer bank is expected to increase its 
product prices after acquiring competitors.  A loan-rate-setting acquirer bank facing 
a low q  may attempt to increase its loan rate when there is a negative product effect, 
a positive interaction effect, and a positive risk effect.  The above finding is 
consistent with the theory that the driving force behind acquisition is to gain market 
power.  The synergistic benefits from combining two banks into one with reducing 
costs and increasing efficiency are generated not through substitution but by 
complementing each bank’s product’s strengths.9  We argue that the 
portfolio-theoretic analysis of risk effect and the firm-theoretic analysis of product 
and interactive operation effects have an important relationship that can be used to 
analyze the cost-benefit analysis of an acquirer bank’s acquisition decisions under 
uncertainty.
Consider next the impact on the acquirer bank’s loan rate from a change in the 
capital-to-deposit ratio.  The total change in LR  from a change q  is given by
                                                          
9 In general, there are three types of mergers: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers.  
Complementarity in this model may be treated as conglomerate mergers which can create or reinforce 
market power since both the acquirer and the acquired banks facilities tacit collusion as well as 
diversification.
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The interpretation of the result follows a similar argument as in the case of a 
change in q .  The acquirer bank’s decision for external growth through an 
acquisition strategy generally requires raising new capital to purchase a controlling 
equity interest in the acquired bank.  This decision is complicated by the existing 
capital structures of both the acquirer and the acquired banks and by the regulatory 
capital requirements.  Capital regulation in bank mergers and acquisitions is 
inevitably a regulatory intervention, the process through which the banking authorities 
attempt to correct a perceived unsafe or unsound banking practice.  Given the 
concern about the intervention of capital regulation in bank mergers and acquisitions, 
an optimal adjustment on the acquirer bank’s loan-rate setting is required to maintain 
the net gain maximization from its strategic acquisition investment.
aG  can be viewed as a marginal risk effect of capital regulation of the multiple 
loans and dG  can be that of the acquirer bank’s loan.  We assume that aG and
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dG  are positive since the bank authority attempts to correct a perceived unsafe 
banking practice by increasing the capital-to-deposit ratio.  The result of equation 
(18) is stated as follows.  An increase in the capital-to-deposit ratio decreases the 
acquirer bank’s loan-rate setting ( LR ) under 0
* =¶¶ LL RR  (Cournot-type “adjusted 
variation”), the negative product effect (complements) and the positive interactive 
operation effect (strategic complements).10  As the acquirer bank is regulated by an 
increase in the capital relative to deposit level, it must provide a return to a larger 
equity base in its acquisition activity.  One way the acquirer bank may attempt to 
augment its total returns from the acquisition is by shifting its investments to its loan 
portfolio and away from the open market securities.  If loan demand is relatively 
rate-elastic, a larger loan portfolio is possible at a reduced loan rate.
The interpretation of equation (18) follows Zarruk &Madura’s model in the case 
of decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion.11  We argue that the negative 
relationship between loan-rate setting and capital regulation in this paper can be 
explained not only by the risk effect but also the product effect and the interactive 
operation effect.  Therefore, this paper sheds light upon risk effect 
(portfolio-theoretic analysis) and product and interactive operation effects 
(firm-theoretic analysis) in capital regulation and acquisition.
                                                          
10 Cournot-type conjectural variation as it is commonly called is usually described as a competitive 
behavior between firms.  Rather than using the term “conjectural variation”, we use “adjusted 
variation” since a multiple loan function, )),(),,(( *** LLLL RRLRRLM , of adjusting operation 
between loans by the acquirer bank is modeled in this paper.
11 Zarruk & Madura (1992) examined the relationship between capital regulation and the optimal bank 
interest margin.  This paper investigated the relationship between capital regulation and the optimal 
acquirer bank’s loan-rate setting.
26
5.  Conclusions
Bank acquisitions are observable forms of behavior that reflect this decision.  
As such, bank acquisitions offer an opportunity for observing banking motivations 
and behavior in detail.  A microeconomic model of a loan-rate-setting bank’s 
acquisition decision under uncertainty was proposed in this paper that focused on a 
contingent claim analysis.  The distinguishing characteristic of this model is that 
loan-rate-settings, the give-and-take of the negotiation on premiums paid in 
acquisition and capital regulation are simultaneously incorporated into the model.  
Based on a realistic view of an acquirer bank’s acquisition decision, it seems that the 
conditions listed above are important and necessary.  More importantly, these 
considerations play an important role in determining loan-rate decisions (the 
firm-theoretic approach) and hence optimal loan portfolio (the portfolio-theoretic 
approach) in bank acquisitions using a framework based on the Black-Scholes 
formula.
Emphasizing the acquisition decision associated with uncertainty under loan-rate 
conducting behavioral modes, there are two conclusions suggested by the model in 
this paper.  First, the acquirer bank’s give-and-take negotiation result expressed by 
the proportion of the combined banks owned by the acquirer bank’s shareholders has a 
direct impact on its loan rate setting with the net gain maximization in the acquisition 
decision.  In particular, we show that a decrease in this proportion increases the 
acquirer bank’s loan rate setting under the negative product effect, the positive 
interactive operation effect, as well as the positive risk effect.  The above finding is 
consistent with the theory that the driving force behind acquisition is gaining market 
power.  Second, we show that the capital regulation has a negative effect on the 
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acquirer bank’s loan rate setting behavioral modes under the Cournot-type adjusted 
variation, the nature of loan complements and the operation of loan strategic 
complements.  A strategic option, the contemporary model presented in this paper, 
provides an alternative explanation for the acquirer’s bank strategies for operating and 
competing in the market under capital regulation that goes beyond those attained 
through traditional bank acquisition strategies.
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